no matter who wins the us presidential election, im hoping someone gifts the victor the big golden book version of 'how to mullah your way to the top--and stay there: sistani's success strategies'.   id also hope our presidential  candidates weren't so caught up in their endless game of 'i'm rubber... you're glue' that they missed observing the grand ayatollah sistani at the top of his game.

within 36 hours of returning to iraq from london where he'd undergone treatment for a cardiac problem, the old man in black resolved the most potentially disastrous crisis to plague iraq's new government; a problem which--until last friday morning--appeared certain to end only in immediate bloodshed and eventual retribution.  amazingly, the grand ayatollah  made it go away without brandishing a weapon...raising his voice...or indulging himself by making a dramatic public appearance before and afterwards.  im guessing he didnt even break a aweat.  in the process, he proved--without seeming to have done so--himself much more powerful than the new iraqi government, the coalition's 100,000+ troops and the most popular of his current potential challengers

it started earlier this year--almost exactly 5 months prior to the day it ended--when the coalition's provisional authority, apparently determined to clarify for iraqis the difference between an authoritarian regime and modern democracy, exercised its right to freedom from the press by shutting down a newspaper sponsored by wannabe cleric muqtada  al sadr.   al-sadr then unleashed his al-madhi militia against coalition forces, in turn, inspiring a separate armed insurgence  in sunni falloujah that would demolish--among other things--the widely held notion that iraq's shi'a and sunni muslim factions could be united only in their hatred of israel and each other. 

coalition troops--tasked to restore order without further antagonizing iraq's populace--found themselves engaged in combat on several fronts.   after  weeks of fierce street fighting in falloujah, a cease fire was negotiated there and the coalition took the battle to al-sadr and his militia who--by then--had taken refuge in najaf's (and shi'a islam's) holiest mosque: the imam ali shrine.

to understand the quandary this created for the powers that be in iraq, it's crucial to know the following:

• shi'a is short for shi'at ali--or 'the party of ali'  (imam ali being  muhammed's first cousin who is regarded by shi'ites as the rightful heir to the caliphate. allegiance to imam ali is the divide separating shi'ite from sunni muslims (who consider shi'a heretical)
• at shi'a's core is a celebrated tradition of martyrdom (ali's son--who was killed defending his father's lineage is, in this respect, vaguely analogous to christ)
• a key component of shi'a is worshipping at three shrines,the primary one being imam ali's shrine in najaf
• in shi'a, temporal and spiritual power transfers through descendence --as it does in christianity's apostolic tradition.
• the vast majority of iraqis are shi'ites

al-sadr is the sole surviving son of a popular, powerful imam who was murdered (or martyred) by saddam; his claims to authority are derived from his father. to his detriment, al-sadr is not credentialed as an islamic scholar. under more normal circumstances, he would be considered merely a good candidate for potential empowerment assuming he eventually became a qu'ranic scholar.  few circumstances in iraq are normal now though, and al-sadr used the chaos to his best advantage.  occupying the shrine bought him both fame and time. the coalition seemed unwilling to violate and/or damage his refuge.  more powerful clerics, not wishing to be seen as allies of the coalition, were lenient in their calls for al-sadr to leave the mosque.  in response to their requests, al-sadr shined them on, claiming to be engaged in negotiating a safe evacuation. the new iraqi government was leery to remove him by force--and very likely unable to do so in any event.

as the siege continued, it worked to al-sadr's benefit by creating a cult of charisma. defying the coalition enhanced his stature turning him into an every more potent symbol of resistance and a wiling martyr in the cause of shia.

al-sadr's new career as a martyr was looking more likely at the beginning of last week.  coalition troops, working with iraqi special forces, had been slowly tightening their hold on the shrine and were, at that point, within 50 yards of their objective. it was very obvious that neither side--nor the holy shrine--was going to emerge unscathed

without knowing what was happening behind the scenes, it seems plausible sistani had for months been content to remain uninvolved. although al-sadr was gaining power at his expense, it was al-sadr's militia and the coalition forces who were dying to pay the bill. every day al-sadr remained defiant, the new government--which sistani publicly snubbed--lost more credibility.  all good things have to come to an end someday and sistani--wisely realizing the benefits of choosing his own someday, picked august 27, 2004

as the republican convention trots out its dog-and-pony show this week, there may well be some minor flourishes of political panache. absent of something totally unexpected happening, nothing there will trump sistani's performance last week. while we we're left wondering about nuance and the implications of our candidates' actions 30 years ago. iraqis need look back only a few days to know exactly who's in charge there. 

this just in: abc network news is announcing that al-sadr has now ordered his al-mahdi militia to cease fighting the coalition and the iraqi government  (in sadr city and elsewhere).  according to their broadcast, al-sadr is now willing to enter the political process (although it also appears the government and coalition are very skeptical).  stay tuned sportsfans!